A common assumption in Political Science literature is policy commitment: candidates maintain their electoral promises. We drop such assumption and we show that costless electoral campaign can be an effective way of transmitting information to voters. The result is robust to relevant equilibrium refinements. An unavoidable proportion of ambiguous politicians emerges. JEL Classification: D72, P16, C73
Introduction
It is commonplace to say that electoral promises cannot be taken at their face value. However, parties and candidates invest a considerable amount of effort and resources in producing electoral messages. Presumably, electoral campaign is believed to be a credible mean to attract voters' support. But if campaigns are a mere act of promising why should they influence citizens?
Intuitively, campaigns convey information useful to predict future policies and future policies should be predictable from present ones. Otherwise, the electoral process could not accomplish its very objective of selecting and retaining politicians according to electors' views. Electoral campaigns, to be meaningful, must alter electors' beliefs about the policies the elected officials will implement. A widely employed explanation is that politicians and elected officials seek reelection. Electoral promises affect voters' expectations about the policies that the elected officials will choose. They provide a benchmark linking promises, policies and reelection (retrospective voting), because a credible threat to reelection is imposed (see Barro (1973) , Ferejohn (1986) and Austen-Smith and Banks (1989) ).
Nevertheless, the disciplining role of electoral competition is only one face of the coin. I prove here that electoral promises provide also a solution to the informational asymmetries between candidates and politicians. The difficulty arises because campaigns are "cheap talk" changing electoral messages alone doe not alter agents' payoff. Downs (1957) himself underlies intimate the relationship between preelection statements and post election behavior. He asserts that it is necessary for rational voting being meaningful. Now we try to prove that a party's ideology must be consistent with either (1) its actions in prior election periods, or (2) its statements in the preceding campaign (including its ideology), or (3) both... A party is reliable if its policy statements at the beginning of an election period-including those in its preëlection campaign-can be used to make accurate predictions of its behavior... A party is responsible if its policies in one period are consistent with its actions (or statements in the preceding period),... (pp. 103-105) ... The absence of reliability means that voters cannot predict the behavior of parties from what the parties say they will do. The absence of responsibility means party behavior cannot be predicted by consistently projecting what parties have done previously....We conclude that reliability is a logical necessity in any rational election system, and that responsibility-though not logically necessary-is strongly implied by rationality as we define it. Of course this conclusion does not prove that reliability and responsibility actually exist in our model. We can demonstrate that they do-and therefore that our model is rational-only by showing that political parties are inexorably driven 1 by their own motives to be both reliable and responsible... (pp. 105-107 ). In our model it is necessary for each party's ideology to bear a consistent relation to its actions.... Any other procedure makes rational voting nearly impossible... (p. 113).
However, most of the classical models of electoral competitions like the Hotelling-Downs one assume that politicians commit to their electoral engagements. The questions about the credibility of campaign promises are left unanswered.
Building on Downs' intuition, the paper provides an explanation based on both informational asymmetries and dynamic aspects, in our case career concerns. Each one of the argument alone is not able to provide a satisfactory solution. Under complete information, politicians cannot credibly commit to policies different from their favorite ones unless elections are infinitely repeated (Alesina (1988) ). The result can be relaxed only allowing for indifference in voters' preferences (Aragonés et al (2005)) 1 . With the prospect of a unique election, costless electoral campaign cannot be meaningful (Harrington (1992a) ) unless one drops the assumption of full policy enforceability (Harrington (1992b)) 2 . The paper that is closest to our approach is Harrington (1993) . He presents a model of finitely (twice) repeated elections under bilateral asymmetric information. Elected officials can choose between two policies. Candidates' and voters' types are the policies they think to be the most beneficial to their income. The type space is finite and beliefs are not consistent with the common prior assumption. While voters' only care about their income, candidates' preferences are lexicographic: they first care about holding the office and then about the policy they implement. In this case, each politician prefers to carry out the policy she beliefs the most effective. The author proves that there exist equilibria in which each candidate truthfully announces and implements her favorite policy. Policy preferences play only a tie-braking role so there is no interaction between reelection concerns and policy preferences.
This paper presents a model in which candidates' care both about office and about the policy they implement if elected. Politicians' and voters' preferences are private information. Differently from Harrington (1993) , the type space is continuous and beliefs are derived from a common prior. The distribution of agents' preferences is symmetric with respect to the origin. Candidates' compete for election by announcing a particular policy. The campaign announcement is costless. The winning candidate implements a policy and runs for reelection against a randomly chosen opponent. The analysis focus on symmetric and monotonic equilibria in which centrist politicians are elected with higher probabilities and implement more centrist policies. Monotonic equilibria permit to rule out very unlikely behaviors where extremists present themselves as centrist, while moderates make an extremist campaign, and have an intuitive appeal. Furthermore, I show that in all non-monotonic equilibrium electoral campaign is meaningful. I refine out-of-equilibrium beliefs with regard to totally unexpected policies, using a refinement first introduced by Bernheim and Severinov (2003) 3 . This refinement is called monotonic D1 Criterion. It adapts the D1 Criterion, proposed by Cho and Kreps (1987) , to monotonic environments. I characterize the set of these equilibria. Innovating on Harrington (1993) , I prove reelection pressures and policy motivations interact giving relevance to electoral promises. A necessary and sufficient condition for informative campaign is a sufficiently high candidates' policy concern. Candidates suffer the tension between pleasing their constituencies and seeking the reelection. The cost of ambiguity is to implement policies that are faraway from the candidate's favorite one. So extremists are less willing to fully pay it. But they do pay a price, even when they fully reveal their preferences. It is because they are forced to please the centrist electorate to enhance their election chances. Centrist candidates prefer to pool on the same electoral campaign to increase their election perspectives. Reliability as commitment to the electoral promises of a relevant part of the politicians emerges endogenously. In the same way responsibility appears, present policies can be useful proxies to predict future ones. But ambiguous (or dishonest behavior cannot be eliminated). There will be always politicians who act as pure office seekers 4 . I show that their share decreases as the degree of policy concern increases. The ambiguity of centrist politicians captures a feature that Harrington (1993) was not able to account for: the partial (but relevant) responsiveness of policies to electoral announcements found by empirical work (see Harrington (1992a) and (1992b) ). The result also connects with the debate on the nature of political center. It is compatible with the vision of a political center lacking of a well-defined ideology and better defined by its opportunistic behavior, which is popular between the general public (see Hazan (1997) ).
The structure of the paper is the following. In Section 2 I describe agents' behavior and I introduce the characteristics of electoral competition and the definition of an Electoral Equilibrium. In Section 3 I present some preliminary results that clarify our choices and I prove the impossibility of fully honest behavior. Section 4 introduces the equilibrium refinement that I analyze in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 draws the conclusion and suggests possible directions of future research. An Appendix contains the proofs that are not included in the main text.
The Model
Candidates' and voters' preferences are private knowledge. Candidates compete for office by making campaign announcements. The winner chooses a policy taking into account reelection perspectives. There are two elections. The policy 3 See also Kartik (2005) . 4 The result is general, does not depend on the equilibrium refinement used. In the campaign stage each candidate j = L, R can send a message m ∈ P j . Based on campaign announcements (m R , m L ) each voter casts her vote for one of the candidates. We assume that there are n voters, where n ∈ N is odd and publicly known. Once in office, the winning candidate implements a policy from her policy space, simultaneously a challenger is selected from the original distribution. Each voter observes incumbent's policy choice and, casts a vote to confirm or to fire her. The "world ends" after this election. Challenger's type is drawn from the original distribution F L 5 . A voter of type α ∈ [−D, D] has preferences represented by the following utility function,
2 , where x is the policy implemented by the elected politician. At each election, a median voter, m v is drawn, independently across time, from a symmetric distribution
The assumption is equivalent to have a known median voter in 0 with a symmetric unknown idiosyncratic bias (see Austen-Smith and Banks (2005) ). Let y > 0 candidates' private benefit derived from holding the office, let k > 0 be their degree of policy implication and let δ ∈ (0, 1) be their intertemporal factor discount. Let x be the policy implemented by the incumbent Candidate α's utility from winning the election is, at each period
A defeated candidate gets 0 utility 6 . Let π i be the probability candidate R wins the election i, for i = 1, 2. When an incumbent is confirmed in the office, she will implement her favorite policy. From implementing policy x R ∈ P R , a candidate of type α ∈ [0, D] will then derive utility:
Voters' behavior
Let m v be the median voter. Let µ be her beliefs about candidates' policy preferences. She votes for candidate R if and Harrington (1992a and b) it follows that any campaign stage before the last election would be irrelevant. 6 The results of the paper can be generalized to the case in which candidates care also about the policy implemented by any incumbent. 
is the decisive median voter. Then R is elected with probability π(µ) = 1− G(e(µ)) = 1 2 + G(−e(µ)), because G is symmetric. The next example presents the values of decisive median voters for two different specifications of the beliefs, that will be used along the paper.
Example 1
If voters believe that candidate R is of type α > 0 and that candidate L is randomly drawn from her original distribution then the decisive median voter is
In this case we denote by π ((α, f (·))) R's probability of election.
Instead, if voters believe that candidate R's type belongs to interval (α 1 , α 2 ) and it is drawn from the distribution F , while candidate L is randomly drawn from her original distribution then the decisive median voter is
We denote by π ((α 1 , α 2 , f (·))) R's probability of election. Using elementary Analysis it can be shown that
The Electoral Equilibrium
A campaign strategy for candidate j = R, L is a function m j : P j → P j . j's campaign strategy is a costless announcement of a policy by candidate j. If elected, candidate j has to choose a policy P j . A policy strategy for incumbent j is a function s j :
Remark 1 Each incumbent is opposed to a randomly chosen challenger, then there is no loss of generality in considering policy strategies that are independent from the other candidate's campaign message. We consider policy strategies that depend only on incumbent's type and from the electoral message she sent, 5 which is policy of the form s j : P ª . r 1j (m R, m L , γ) represents the probability the median voter votes for candidate j at the first election, when she is of type γ and has observed electoral messages (m R, m L ). If j results elected after campaign messages (m R, m L ), r 2j (m R, m L , s j , γ) denote the probability that the median voter of type γ votes for her, when she implements policy s j .
Remark 2 Like in Remark 1, there is no loss of generality in considering second stage voting strategies independent of first stage loser's campaign, Then, we consider voting strategies that depend only on incumbent electoral message, on the policy she implemented and on median voter's type, which is r 2j :
A belief at the first election about candidates is a function µ 1 from the cartesian product of campaign messages P L × P R to the set of joint probability distributions on P 2 . A belief at the second election is a function µ 2 from the cartesian product of campaign messages, first stage voting outcomes, and policy outcomes to the set of joint probability distributions on P 2 .
Definition 1 An electoral equilibrium consists of strategies
Expectations are taken with respect to µ 1 . Analogous requirements are imposed on candidate L's first term probability of election.
Expectations are taken with respect to µ 2 . Analogous requirement are imposed on candidate L's second term probability of election (5) Beliefs are computed using Bayes' rule whenever possible.
Conditions (1) and (2) say that each candidate's electoral and policy strategies are sequentially optimal given her opponent's strategies and voters' decision. Conditions (3) and (4) say that voters' decisions are optimal at each election, given their beliefs.
Set:
π 1R and π 2R are candidate R's probabilities of winning the first and the second election, respectively. Define analogous quantities for candidate L.
In words, an electoral equilibrium is monotonic if centrist candidates have higher probabilities of being elected, and implement more centrist policies.
)) = {α} we say that α separates in campaign or in policy, respectively. Otherwise, we say that α pool.
) we say that α and α 0 pool (together) in campaign or in policy, respectively. If
, then the equilibrium is fully separating. If only one of the two conditions holds, then the equilibrium will be said separating in campaign and in policy, respectively. Analogous definitions hold for candidate L. All along the paper, we devote our attention to symmetric monotonic equilibria. Then, in the analysis, it suffices to consider only one of the two candidates. We will analyze R's strategies omitting the subscript R, when there is no risk of ambiguity. Furthermore we use
The following Remark points out the connectivity properties of monotone equilibria.
There is no loss of generality in assuming that candidates having the same probability of election at the first stage use the same electoral campaign (we assume candidates only use pure strategies). Under this assumption, we can state (2) as.
Monotonicity has a very intuitive appeal and helps to get rid of unlikely equilibria, for example of situations in which centrists and moderates present different electoral platforms, but extremists pool with centrists. We say that the electoral campaign is meaningful if there exist α, α
Preliminary results on monotonic equilibria
The first result provides an additional reason that makes monotonic equilibrium a reasonable choice in this environment. Any electoral equilibrium is, locally, monotonic. In all electoral pools, equilibrium policies are monotonic and second stage election probabilities are decreasing.
Lemma 1 Let x ∈ [0, D] be a campaign message. In all symmetric equilibria:
Symmetric claims hold for candidate L.
From Lemma 1, it follows:
Corollary 1 In any non monotonic equilibrium the electoral campaign is meaningful.
In any monotonic equilibrium, if the types (α 1 , α 2 ) belong to the same policy pool, then there is a set of unused policies. This result will be frequently used. It implies that the policy function has a discontinuity, at the end of any policy pool.
Lemma 2 Let x ∈ [0, D] be a policy and let α 1 < α 2 . If s(α) = x for all α ∈ (α 1 , α 2 ), then there exists h > 0 such that policies in (x, x + h) are not used or
The next result shows that the threat of reelection is effective on the incumbent. In order not to decrease her chances of reelection, she will implement a policy which is more centrist than her favorite one.
It follows that in any monotonic equilibrium some candidates' types are pooling in order to increase the probability of winning the elections. This fact implies that a full separating equilibrium does not exist.
Proposition 4 There exists no policy separating monotonic equilibrium. Hence there is no full separating equilibrium.
Proof. Otherwise, from Lemma 3 s(0) < 0. Any full separating equilibrium is equivalent to a monotonic equilibrium so the second claim follows from the first one.
4 The MD1 refinement
In this section, we present an equilibrium refinement, introduced by Bernheim and Severinov (2003) and studied also in Kartik (2005) for one round signalling games in which costless and costly messages are present. Differently from Kartik (2005) in our model there are two senders and receiver's type is unknown. Furthermore, cheap talk and costly signalling are not simultaneous. We then 8 Property (i) holds in any electoral equilibrium, either symmetric or asymmetric.
9 adapt the refinement to our framework. We apply it only to policies that are never used in equilibrium. Before the Monotonic D1 criterion is defined, we introduce some notation. We will refer to the lower and highest probability of election, following a given pol-
Analogous bounds are symmetrically defined for candidate L.
Definition 4 An electoral equilibrium satisfies the monotonic D1 (MD1)
Assume that there exists a non-empty set of types Ω ⊂ [0, D] such that, for each α / ∈ Ω, there exists some
Analogous requirement is symmetrically imposed on candidate L.
In the case in which [π lR (x), π hR (x)] is substituted by [π(D, f (·)), π(0, f(·))] we would have an adaptation to our setup of the D1 criterion introduced by Cho and Kreps (1987) . (2) extends the monotonicity requirements to out of equilibrium beliefs. If an elected official implements out of equilibrium policy x, she should expect of being reelected with probability between π lR (x) and π hR (x). The refinement assign positive probability only to those types who benefit most from this deviation. From now on, we will refer to MD1 equilibria only, if not otherwise stated.
Equilibrium characterization and existence
If s (·) is increasing then it has at most a countable set of discontinuity points and it is differentiable almost everywhere (see Royden (1988) ). There is no loss of generality in assuming that the electoral campaign is monotonic increasing and that m(α) = α when type α is separating, and that agents having the same probability of being elected at the first election make the same announcement.
Denote by α 1 , α 2 , ...α k , ... where 0 ≤ α 1 < α 2 < ... < α k < ... ≤ D the discontinuity points of s.
Lemma 4 Assume that, for some i = 1, 2, ..., k, ..., the types in (α i , α i+1 ) belong the same policy pool. Then they belong to the same campaign pool.
Proof. Let 0 ≤ α < α 0 < α 00 . By contradiction, assume that some types in (α, α 0 ) ⊂ (α i , α i+1 ) send message m and that the types in (α 0 , α 00 ) ⊂ (α i , α i+1 ) send message m 0 . Let α 0 + ε imitate type α 0 − ε. The gain in the probability of being elected at the first stage is bounded below by a strictly positive constant. The gain in second election probability is non negative. For ε → 0 the loss in policy term goes to 0 by continuity, so the deviation would be profitable for ε small enough.
Observe that α = arg max α 0 π 1 (α 0 ))
So, almost everywhere.
In particular, if all agents in (α 0 , α 00 ) pool on the same campaign but use different policies (π 1 (α))) 0 = 0 so that
Remark 5 If π 1 and π 2 are C 1 and strictly decreasing both problems defined by the differential equations above and the terminal condition S(D) = D have a unique solution such that s(α) < α on (D − ε, D) , for arbitrary small ε > 0. The result follows from Lemma 5 in the Appendix (see also Kartik (2005) ). Such solution is such that s(α) < α on (0, D). Furthermore s(0) < 0. Otherwise the graph of s should crosses the diagonal at some α * > 0. In this case lim α→α * + s 0 (α) = ∞. This is impossible: if the graph cross the diagonal it must be from below because s (α) < α on (0, D).
Remark 6 Condition (2) of Definition 4 can be written in this case as
When there is no risk of ambiguity we omit the arguments β, x, π 2 and we write simply T (α) for T (α, β, x, π 2 ) and T 0 (α) for ∂T ∂α (α, β, x, π 2 ).
From Equation 1 it follows that
Any MD1 equilibrium is characterized by a cutoff type that divides pooling types from separating types.
Proposition 7 Any symmetric MD1 is essentially equivalent 9 to an equilibrium in which, for all i, there exists α
We can go further and characterize all MD1 equilibria. According to Proposition 7 they can belong to four categories: (i) Babbling: equilibria in which all types pool in campaign and policy.
(ii) Campaign irrelevant but policy significative equilibria, in which all types send the same electoral message, but the more extremist types separate in policy. (iii) Weakly expressive campaign equilibria in which centrists and extremists form different campaign pools but extremists separate in policy (iv) Expressive campaign equilibria where centrists pool on the same electoral promise and on the same policy and extremists separate both in campaign and in policy.
The larger is the degree in which candidates cares about the policy they implement, the larger are the possibilities of relevant electoral campaign.
Theorem 8 A symmetric MD1 equilibrium exists. There exist k 0 < k 1 < k 2 and there exists strictly decreasing functions α 1 (k) , α 2 (k) , α 3 (k) with lim k→∞ α i (k) = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3, such that (i) For k ≤ k 0 all MD1 equilibria are fully pooling, which is m(α) = m(0) and
Any symmetric MD1 equilibrium is essentially equivalent to one of the equilibria described above.
Observe that the expressive campaign equilibrium of point (iv) asymptotically converges to a fully separating equilibrium, in which electoral promises are maintained. Theorem 8 relies on the possibilities of threatening the reelection perspectives of the incumbent, if she shirks. It requires beliefs to be correlated outside of the equilibrium path. In the real world electoral disappointment does have an effect on electors. The model we presented does not capture this aspect because the idiosyncratic shocks defining median voter exact position is independent across periods and uncorrelated to actions. Electoral disappointment can be introduced as a shift of voters distribution, correlated with the degree of electoral fulfillment. To make things simple as possible assume that median voter distribution is shifted to left in the case of an R incumbent, or to the right in the case of an L incumbent of a fix factor x > 0, if the elected officer deviates from the expected policy(ies) 10 . The reader can easily verify that the claim of Theorem 8 holds even if we impose voters' beliefs about the two candidates to be independent. More precisely, if
the k 0 , k 1 , k 2 found in the proof of the result would stay the same. Otherwise their value would be larger as it would harder to induce extremists not to pool in campaign. We conjecture that a similar result can be obtained also through a shock which is continuously dependent from the distance between expected policy and implemented one. The MD1 refinement applies only to zero probabilities policies. It is strong enough to shrink dramatically the set of possible equilibria. The key, as for Universal Divinity, is that we ask the support of the distribution to be minimal. If the function T has a a unique maximizer, α, then to such maximizer must be given probability one. Like in Banks (1990) , this leads to equilibria characterized by a unique cutoff type.
The claim of Proposition 4 relies on the boundedness of the type space. Allowing for an unbounded type space can lead to full separation in senderreceiver games with both costly messages and cheap talk (see Kartik (2005) ). It is not the case here. We would obtain full separation in policy, but total pooling in campaign. The reason is that, asymptotically, candidates utilities is null, so it is the effect of career concerns. Very extremist candidates would be incomparably better off by maximizing their first election probability. Full separation could probably be obtained in the case in which candidates care also about challengers' implemented policy.
Conclusions
The paper has presented a model of electoral competition under incomplete information in which candidates care about both office and the policy. It introduces incomplete information and the dynamic aspects of a double election and it proves that electoral campaign is able to convey relevant information to 10 Excluding the case of a totally out of equilibrium policy, which defines the MD1 criterion.
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voters even when campaigning is not costly. The work opens a possibility for endogenous commitment. The result is driven by both candidates' career concern and the threat of failed reelection. The impossibility for candidates to sustain policies that are too faraway from their ideal ones shapes then policy they carry out in the first term. Extending Harrington (1993) , I find that not only reelection pressure but also policy motivation can give relevance to electoral promises. Despite of it centrists' electoral opportunism cannot be eliminated. It can be only be reduced if candidates' degree of policy implication is high enough. This is consistent with the empirical literature which estimates that only a part (even if relevant) of policies are responsive to electoral compromises.
The investigation can be extended in different directions. On the one hand toward the study of more complex models of competition. In our model the " world ends" after the second election. So just before there is no place for meaningful electoral competition before the last election. Allowing for repeated interactions should make it relevant. A suitable and realistic model would be the one of an overlapping generation of politicians that can stay in the office for a fixed number of terms. The threat to reelection imposed on the incumbent would be reinforced, and so the degree of commitment.
On the other hand, a partially unexplored field is the nature itself of electoral campaign. It is usually modeled as a one-shot policy announcements (either costly or cheap). Despite of it, in the real world, electoral campaigns are complex and longer interactions between electors and politicians. Voters are continuously exposed to announcements. Politicians invest many resources in pools to discover electors' intentions and tastes. The empirical literature considered these aspects as an important part of the process of information transmission ((see for instance Alvarez (1998) ). Parties try both to send reliable messages and to get information about electors. There is little theoretical investigation about such phenomena, but the models of repeated cheap talk (see Krishna and Morgan (2004) ) could provide useful tools to deal with the topic. s(α, x) ) and π 0 = π 0 2 (x, s(α 0 , x)). (i) The proof of the claim is by contradiction. Assume that t 0 < t. From incentive compatibility it follows:
Which is:
Summing up the two inequalities:
Simplifying:
that yields a contradiction because α < α 0 . (ii) The proof of the claim is by contradiction. Assume that π > π 0 . From (i) and from the definition of monotonic equilibrium it follows that it cannot be the case that α and α 0 belong to different policy pools or that α and α 0 belong the same policy pool or that α 0 pools with some other type while α separate. It must be the case that α pools and α 0 separates. From Remark 3, the pool α belongs to is an interval (α 1 , α 2 ) (or [α 1 , α 2 ], or (α 1 , α 2 ], or [α 1 , α 2 )). In such a case the decisive median voter for α is:
while the decisive median voter for α 0 > α is:
which yields a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 2 From Remark 3, part (3) m(α) constant on (α 1 , α 2 ). There is no loss of generality in assuming that (α 1 , α 2 ) is the interior of the corresponding policy pool. From monotonicity s(α 2 ) ≥ x. Consider first the case s(α 2 ) > x. Then policies in (x, s(α 2 )) are not used in equilibrium. Now let s(α 2 ) = x and set b x = lim α&α 2 s (α) = inf α>α 2 s (α). Observe that s(α) > x for α > α 2 . By contradiction, suppose that b x = x. Set π 1ε = π 1 (α 2 + ε), π 1 = π 10 , π 2ε = π 2 (α 2 + ε), π 2 = π 20 . It must be the case that π 2ε < π 2 and 0 < π 1ε ≤ π 1 for all ε > 0. The difference π 2 − π 2ε is bounded below by some positive constant c. Furthermore,
is the net loss or the net gain to type α 2 + ε from imitating type α 2 .
As it is an equilibrium L(ε) ≤ 0 for all ε > 0.
Proof of Lemma 3 By contradiction, suppose that
As s is strictly increasing π 2ε < π 2 and π 1ε ≤ π 1 for all ε > 0. Let L(ε) be the net loss or the net gain to type
0 from Example 1.
As B(0) = 0, then B(ε) > 0 for ε small enough. But then type b α + ε could profitably mimic type b α, for ε small enough, yielding a contradiction. By contradiction, assume that s(α) > α. Consider type α 0 = s(α) > α. By monotonicity s(α 0 ) > s (α) because agents in [α 1 , α 2 ) separate. But then α 0 could profitably imitate α: the probabilities of election at both stages increase and she would not pay policy costs.
Section 5
Lemma 5 
Furthermore, if there exists δ > 0 such that f y (x, y) ≥ 0 for every (x, y) ∈ {(x, y) ∈ B : ||(x, y) − (D, D)|| < δ, y < x, }, then the solution is unique.
Proof. The problem does not satisfy the local Lipschitz conditions in a neighborhood of D. The existence part of the Proof is by approximation. Let y ε be the solution of the following Cauchy problem:
Here the local existence and uniqueness theorem applies. In order to prove that y ε (x) can be extended to the interval [0, D] it suffices to show that there exists no x * ∈ [0, D), such that lim x→x * + y 0 ε (x) = ∞. In this case the extension theorem applies. First observe that if y ε is defined and
or some δ 0 < δ 00 < δ but then
From the previous observations it follows that the RHS converges to 2δ while the LHS is independent of δ 0 < δ. Then y ε (x * + δ) − (x * + δ) > 2δ > 0, which yields a contradiction. y ε (x) is C 1 with respect to ε on [0, D) (Pontryagin (1962) , ch. 23). y ε (D) → D for ε → 0. By contradiction, assume that, for some x ∈ [0, D), y ε (x) is not converging for ε → 0. In particular, for some 0 < δ < D, the Ascoli-Arzelá Theorem does not apply in [0,
It must be the case that {y ε } ε>0 it is not uniformly continuous then sup ε>0 y 0 ε = ∞. As above, it follows that y ε (x) > x for some ε and some x ∈ [0, D − δ], a contradiction. So y ε converges uniformly to some y in each interval [0, D − δ]. Each y ε satisfies y 0 (x) (y (x) − x) = f (x, y (x)), and y 0 ε converges uniformly to some continuous z. Then y 0 = z. The local existence and uniqueness theorem implies that y is independent of the choice of δ. The function y is defined and differentiable on [0, D) and satisfies
against the uniform convergence of y 0 ε . The existence part is proved by setting y(D) = lim x→D y(x) = 0. Now we prove uniqueness. Let f such that that, for some δ > 0, f y (x, y) ≥ 0 for every (x, y) ∈ {(x, y) ∈ B : ||(x, y) − (D, D)|| < δ, y < x, }. By contradiction, assume that y 1 and y 2 two different solutions of the problem. The local existence and uniqueness theorem implies that the graphs of the function cross only at (D, D). There is no loss of generality then in assuming that y 1 (x) < y 2 (x) on
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[0, D). Then, for some δ small enough y y 2 (x) ) with at least one strict inequality. This yields a contradiction because y 2 solves the ODE problem.
From Lemma 2 follows that if some types (α 0 , α 00 ) ⊂ (α i , α i+1 ) are in the same policy pool then (α i , α i+1 ) is included in the same policy pool. So if (α i , α) with α ≤ α i+1 are separating then types in (α i , α i+1 ) are all separating. (ii) Let s * = s(α) for all α ∈ (α i , α i+1 ). If agents in (α i+1 , α i+2 ) are pooling then, for ε small enough α i+1 + ε can profitably deviate by implementing policy s i − δ, with δ small enough µ(α i+1 | m(α i+1 + ε), s i − δ) = 1. It is because, from the continuity of x on (α i+1 , α i+2 ), the gain in second election probability is bounded below by a positive constant, while loss in policy term is of order δ 2 . (iii) If types in (α i , α i+1 ) are separating and types in (α i+1 , α i+2 ) are pooling then type α i+1 + ε can profitably deviate by sending (m(α i+1 − ε), s i − δ). µ(α i+1 | (m(α i+1 − ε), s i − δ)) = 1. For δ small enough, the loss in policy term is compensated by the gain in election probability. If types in (α, α i+1 ) are pooling then, for ε small enough α i+1 + ε can profitably deviate by implementing policy s i − δ, with δ small enough. µ(α i+1 | m(α i+1 + ε), s i − δ) = 1 The loss in policy term is of order δ 2 , the gain in second election probability is bounded below by a positive constant. Proof of Proposition 7 It suffices to show that α * > 0. By contradiction, assume that α * = 0. In this the equilibrium would have a monotonic electoral equilibrium with separating policies contradicting Proposition 4.
Proof of Theorem 8 We will always assume that, whenever beliefs are not imposed by Bayesian, consistency or by the MD1 refinement, if a candidate announces a policy and implements a different one, then the median voter will not confirm her. This is consistent as we allow beliefs to be correlated. Let us consider the different possibilities.
(a) The first case is α * = D so that the equilibrium is equivalent to an equilibrium in which all types are pooling together at 0 a and at both stages they are elected with probability 1 2 , and after the first election all pool on policy 0. The payoff for type α is 
where π 2 (D) is the probability a candidate is elected at the second stage if perceived as type D and the other candidate is selected from F L , which is with probability
2 , because of the symmetry of G. For k < k 0 a (continuous of) pooling equilibrium exists but it does not satisfies the MD1 criterion. (b) The second case is that α * < D, and all types pool at the first stage. In such a case all types are elected with probability 1 2 at the first election. At the second stage type α ∈ [0, α * ] is elected with probability:
where: 
